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Abstract
Objective: Evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of Anonym, a tool for
de-identifying free-text health records based on conditional random fields
classifiers informed by linguistic and lexical features, as well as features ex-
tracted by pattern matching techniques. De-identification of personal health
information in electronic health records is essential for the sharing and sec-
ondary usage of clinical data. De-identification tools that adapt to different
sources of clinical data are attractive as they would require minimal inter-
vention to guarantee high effectiveness.
Methods and Materials: The effectiveness and robustness of Anonym
are evaluated across multiple datasets, including the widely adopted Inte-
grating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) dataset, used for evaluation in a
de-identification challenge. The datasets used here vary in type of health
records, source of data, and their quality, with one of the datasets containing
optical character recognition errors.
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Results: Anonym identifies and removes up to 96.6% of personal health
identifiers (recall) with a precision of up to 98.2% on the i2b2 dataset, out-
performing the best system proposed in the i2b2 challenge. The effectiveness
of Anonym across datasets is found to depend on the amount of information
available for training.
Conclusion: Findings show that Anonym compares to the best approach
from the 2006 i2b2 shared task. It is easy to retrain Anonym with new
datasets; if retrained, the system is robust to variations of training size, data
type and quality in presence of sufficient training data.
Keywords: Conditional Random Fields, Pattern Matching,
De-identification, Health records.
1. Background
Electronic health records (EHRs) often contain personal health informa-
tion (PHI) that can uniquely identify a patient. The United States’s Health
Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has stipulated 17
categories of PHIs that must be de-identified, the most prevalent are outlined
in Table 1.
Access to EHRs outside of the primary health provider and the sharing of
such data for research purposes is fundamental for critical data mining and
information retrieval tasks in the health domain; for example, the identifica-
tion of adverse drug reactions or patient recruitment for clinical studies [1, 2].
However, PHIs are pervasive in unstructured portions of EHRs, which un-
dermines access and sharing of such important data [3].
De-identification is the process of removing PHIs from medical records.
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Table 1: Subset of the United States’s Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act personal health identifiers types considered for the evaluation of Anonym.
PHI Type Meaning
Patients First, middle and last names of patients and their family members (including
initials of names).
Doctors Similar to patients category, includes names and initials of health professionals.
Dates All numerical and literal reference to dates, including years and days of the
week.
Hospitals Names of medical facilities and practices.
IDs Any combination of digits and letters that refer to medical records, patient
numbers, accession numbers, doctors identifiers, laboratory identifiers, etc.




Any reference to landline, fax and mobile phone numbers or phone extension
numbers.
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Manual de-identification of electronic health records is time and resource
consuming. Dorr et al. [4] found that on average 87.2 ± 61 seconds are
required to manually de-identify a narrative text of an EHR; an EHR on
average contains 7.9± 6.1 PHI entities.
Anonym is a software tool developed at the Australian e-Health Re-
search Centre, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisa-
tion (CSIRO), that automatically de-identifies EHRs. Anonym is based on
the combination of conditional random fields (CRF) classifiers, informed by
a number of linguistic and lexical features and pattern matching techniques.
The de-identification method used in Anonym is described in Section 3. The
results of the empirical evaluation reported in Section 5 shall show that, if
enough training data is provided, Anonym is capable of effectively de-identify
free-text EHRs, irrespective of type, source or quality of data. In addition,
results demonstrate that Anonym is comparable to the best state-of-the-art
de-identification system proposed by Uzuner et al. [5]. In addition, the results
also demonstrate that retraining is necessary when changing datasets.
2. Related work
Two areas of related work are reviewed: de-identification and named
entity recognition.
2.1. De-identification
Research on de-identification of EHRs has flourished as a result of the
introduction of the 2006 Integrating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) dataset
shared task [5]. This shared task provided an evaluation framework for de-
identification, consisting of a dataset of manually annotated medical dis-
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charge summaries populated with ambiguous PHIs and metrics to measure
the performance of de-identification systems. Uzuner et al. [5] provide an
overview of systems that participated in i2b2. The techniques used by par-
ticipants included conditional random fields, rule-based approaches, hidden
Markov models (HMM), and support vector machines. The best system in
i2b2 was developed by Wellner et al. [6]. Their system is similar to the ap-
proach considered in this paper: both use CRFs to label tokens and regular
expressions to form one of the feature classes. However, our approach differs
in that we do not use lexicons of locations and English words and we consider
additional features such as part of speech.
Uzuner et al. [7] have studied the role of local context (i.e. the words
that are immediate neighbours of the target PHI or that have immediate
syntactic relation with it) for de-identification when using support vector
machine classifiers. They observed that features that thoroughly capture
local context are beneficial to the PHI de-identification task. While not
relying on local context features as thoroughly as Uzuner et al. [7], Anonym
does use features that implicitly capture local context information, such as
token n-grams and part-of-speech.
An overview of approaches to PHI de-identification is provided by Meystre
et al. [8]. From their analysis, they concluded that methods based on lin-
guistic resources, such as dictionaries, tend to perform better with rarely
mentioned PHIs. Vice versa, they found that machine learning techniques
better generalise to PHIs that are not mentioned in dictionaries, although
machine learning tends to have problems identifying PHI types that rarely
occur in the training corpus. Rule-based techniques and machine learning
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algorithms have been recently integrated in the stepwise hybrid approach
proposed by Ferrandez et al. [9]. Anonym uses rule-based techniques in its
pattern-matching component for feature generation.
Recent work has focused on semi-supervised or iterative approaches that
improve the human-supervised de-identification workflow process as a whole,
rather than producing a fully automatic de-identification system. Hanauer
et al. [10] constructed statistical de-identification models by iteratively per-
forming (i) annotation of a small EHRs sample; (ii) training of a CRF model;
(iii) automatic identification of PHIs on a small sample of unseen data; (iv)
manual correction of the errors on the unseen data; and (v) retraining of the
model. Bostro¨m and Dalianis [11] used active learning to train a random
forest classifier to detect PHIs from Swedish EHRs. They also investigated
different strategies to select the most discriminative samples for online man-
ual annotation.
In a previous paper [12], we presented the approach underlying Anonym
and initial results that showed our tool is comparable to state-of-the-art ap-
proaches on the 2006 i2b2 shared task. In that work, we have also briefly
investigated the effectiveness on a small set of pathology reports supplied by
an Australian cancer registry. This article extends that work by consider-
ing (1) additional datasets, including a larger set of cytology and pathology
reports from a statewide Australian cancer registry and 1,885 clinical notes
from the MTSamples dataset [13]; (2) further investigation of the adaptabil-
ity of Anonym across the different datasets.
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2.2. Named entity recognition and conditional random fields
De-identification is a specialisation of named entity recognition (NER),
i.e., the task of recognising references in text to information units like names
(e.g., persons, organisations, locations) and numeric expressions (e.g., dates,
money). While early NER systems were based on highly engineered rules,
the most recent and successful approaches adopt supervised machine learning
to automatically induce recognition rules from a corpus of training examples.
Popular supervised algorithms for NER include HMMs, decision trees, max-
imum entropy, support vector machines and CRF. A survey of NER models,
common features, and evaluation techniques is given by Nadeau and Sekine
[14].
Anonym is based on the conditional random fields approach to learn PHIs
and then identify new occurrences of PHIs from unseen data. A CRF is a dis-
criminative undirected probabilistic graphical model that, given an observed
sequence, defines a log-linear distribution over labelled sequences [15]. Math-
ematically, given an observed sequence x, a CRF predicts a label y from the
set of possible labels Y if y maximises the conditional probability p(y|x), i.e.,
if p(y|x) is greater than any p(y∗|x), for all y∗ in Y \ {y}. This conditional
nature of CRF is the key characteristic distinguishing CRF from HMM; it
also means that the independence assumption necessary to ensure tractable
inference in HMM is relaxed in the CRF approach.
The CRF approach underneath Anonym uses, among others, features
generated by a set of pattern matching rules (regular expressions). This
feature generation approach is similar to that of Collins [16], who introduced
pattern features that map tokens onto a set of patterns.
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3. Anonym: de-identifying EHRs with CRF and pattern matching
Anonym consists of three main modules: (i) the automatic feature gen-
eration component, (ii) the model training component that uses the features
generated by the first module, and (iii) the classification component which
applies the learnt model to unseen data. A fourth module is responsible
for the generation of PHI surrogates consistent with those identified and the
replacement of the identified PHI with its surrogate. This component has
not been used to post-process the PHIs identified by Anonym in this work.
Instead, we used this component to pre-process the data of two of the three
datasets considered here as they could not be distributed with the original
text representing the identified PHIs. The component is briefly described in
Section 4.2. Next, we describe the feature generation component of Anonym.
We do not describe the other two components in Anonym as they resemble
standard CRF classifiers. Note, however, that the training module allows for
selecting which features are used for learning.
Anonym is able to extract a number of lexical and linguistic features,
grouped in seven general families: (1) basic features, which comprise word
shapes (e.g. the presence of capitalised characters at the beginning of the
word or across the whole word) and character n-grams (n = 6); (2) disjunc-
tive features, which capture disjunctions of words and word shapes within
windows of words; (3) short character n-grams (i.e. 3-grams) in place of
the 6-grams used as basic features; (4) combination of short words, which
creates a feature combining adjacent words of length three or less; (5) po-
sition features, which capture the position of a word in the sentence and
in the PHIs. In addition we separately extracted features using (6) part-
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of-speech obtained from the Stanford Part of Speech Tagger [17], and (7)
pattern matching techniques, i.e., by defining a set of regular expressions
and assigning specific labels to tokens that match these regular expressions.
While lexical and linguistic features, such as word shapes and part-of-
speech, are commonly used for de-identification, the extraction of an addi-
tional feature set using pattern matching techniques via regular expressions
is a key characteristic of Anonym. In the current implementation, Anonym
identifies patterns for the following categories: Date, DateLabel, Time, Phone
and PhoneAreaCode (with different patterns for United States and Australian
numbers), PhoneLabel, NameLabel, Numeric, PersonTitle. The category
Numeric includes patterns that match occurrences of digits, i.e., that match
the regular expression "([0-9]1,)". The category PersonTitle refers to
occurrences of name references; regular expressions for this category identify
tokens matching a list of name titles (e.g., Dr., Prof.) and capture multiple
references to names. Example regular expressions for the other categories
are given in Table 2. A feature value is assigned to a token if matches one
of the patterns, e.g. if a string is matched by a regular expression identi-
fying a possible date, the value DATE is assigned to the pattern matching
feature. These regular expressions were formed by analysing the training set
of the i2b2 dataset [5]; in addition, relevant patterns were adapted to mimic
Australian conventions for expressing dates, phones, etc.
4. Evaluating Anonym
An objective of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of
Anonym. To do so, we first investigate whether Anonym consistently achieves
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Table 2: Examples of regular expressions used by Anonym to identify pattern matching
features for different categories. Regular expressions are reported as the strings used as






Phone (AU): "((([0-9]{4})([ \\-\\.])([0-9]{4}))|([0-9]{2}([ \\- \\.])
[0-9]{3}([ \\- \\.])[0-9]{3})|([0-9]{8}))"
PhoneArearCode (AU): ((([+]?([0-9]{2})([ \\. \\-]?)[0-9])|((\\()(\\b)
[0-9]{2}(\\))))|((\\b)))
Time: (\\b)(([0]?[0-9]|[1][1-2])(([ \\.\\- \\:])[0-5]
[0-9]){1,2})([ \\. \\- \\:]?)(am|pm)
Date: (?<!([\\\\\\/ \\-]([0-9]{1,})?))((([01]?[0-9]|[2][1-4])
(([ \\. \\- \\:])[0-5][0-9]){1,2})(?!(([ \\. \\- \\:]
[0-5][0-9])?)([ \\. \\- \\:]?(am|pm))))
high effectiveness across the considered datasets (RQ1). The comparison of
results across datasets will allow us to assess whether different training size
and class distributions (of PHIs) affect effectiveness and in particular if high
effectiveness is associated with large training data and low diversity across
instances of PHI types (RQ2). This analysis will also highlight whether
there is a unique combination of features that provides the highest effective-
ness across all datasets (RQ3). The last two aspects contribute to evaluate
the robustness of our software. To complement this analysis, we also study
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whether approaches trained on one dataset adapt to other datasets (RQ4).
4.1. Evaluation datasets
Three datasets were used to evaluate Anonym. The 2006 i2b2 shared task
dataset consists of 889 medical discharge summaries annotated for evaluating
PHI de-identification approaches (of these, 669 documents are commonly
used for training, while the remaining 220 are used for testing). Details
about this dataset are provided by Uzuner et al. [5]. This dataset is used
to compare Anonym with state-of-the-art approaches studied in the relevant
literature.
A second dataset was formed using 1,885 clinical notes from the MTSam-
ples corpus. The dataset was manually annotated by reviewers at the Uni-
versity of California at San Diego, following the procedure outlined by South
et al. [13]. The annotations in this corpus refer to the broader set of PHIs de-
fined by HIPAA, including clinical eponyms, health care units, organisation
names, etc. As detailed later, we only used a subset of these PHI types. PHIs
identified by reviewers were automatically replaced with realistic surrogates
produced by the Anonym module outlined in Section 4.2.
A third dataset was compiled using pathology and cytology reports ob-
tained from Cancer Institute New South Wales1; we refer to this dataset
as CINSW. The dataset contains 852 free-text reports acquired from paper
source using an optical character recognition (OCR) software. The CINSW
dataset used here is about four time larger than that used in the prelimi-
1With ethical approval granted by the New South Wales Population & Health Services
Research Ethics Committee.
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nary experiments reported in [12]. Reports in CINSW differ from those in
the i2b2 and MTSamples datasets because of the linguistic and orthographic
conventions in Australia vs. the U.S.. In addition, these documents contain
OCR errors and loss in formatting, which may cause lower effectiveness from
automatic de-identification tools. Details of OCR errors found in the data
obtained from Cancer Institute New South Wales are reported in [18]. Man-
ual annotation of PHIs in the CINSW dataset was performed by two authors
of this paper. The process was aided by a graphical interface that highlighted
patterns identified by the regular expressions described in Section 3. Each
report was first annotated by one author and then manually reviewed by
the second author. Manually identified PHIs were replaced using Anonym,
similarly to the previous datasets. Note that patient names were not present
in the PHIs identified in this dataset. This is because in the reports acquired
from Cancer Institute New South Wales, names of patients are only present
in the headers of the reports, which were excluded by the template used in
the OCR process.
Not all the 18 PHI types identified by HIPAA are present across all three
datasets. We restrict our experiments only to the subset of PHIs that is
most commonly present across all datasets; considered PHIs are outlined in
Table 3 along with occurrence statistics. Note that in the i2b2 dataset names
of patients and doctors are annotated as separate PHIs; in the MTSamples
dataset, there are different annotation types depending on whether a name
refers to a patient, a relative of the patient, or another person, and there is
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Table 3: Distribution of instances across personal health identifier types in the datasets
considered by the evaluation of Anonym. For the i2b2 dataset, statistics are collected
across both training and testing data.
# of samples
PHI Type i2b2 MTSamples CINSW
DATE 6,816 1,667 975
PATIENT 929 - -
DOCTOR 3,386 - -
NAME - 286 1,725
AGE 16 1,748 13
ID 4,763 95 747
HOSPITAL 2,305 - -
LOCATION 243 - -
INSTITUTION - 1,170 177
PHONE 222 7 540
no type that explicitly indicates names of doctors2. In the CINSW dataset
there is no mention of names of patients, as detailed previously. We conflate
references to names into the PHI type NAME in the MTSamples and CINSW
datasets, while we keep references to patients and doctors separated in the
i2b2 datasets to allow for direct comparison with results presented in the
literature. Similarly, we distinguish between mentions of locations and hos-
pitals in i2b2, while conflate relevant mentions into the type INSTITUTION
for the MTSamples and CINSW datasets.
2These are instead grouped in the annotation type HealthCareProviderName.
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4.2. Generation of PHIs surrogates
A module within Anonym has been implemented to automate the re-
placement of PHIs with realistic surrogates. Person names, institutions and
locations are replaced with surrogates from a candidate list. Anonym allows a
list of candidate surrogates to be provided by the user; alternatively, if no list
is provided, or the corresponding setting is enabled, candidate surrogates are
scrapped from the Web, using resources such as the White Pages website3
and relevant Wikipedia pages4. To maintain consistency with the original
PHIs, the tool attempts to identify the format used by the PHI, e.g., for a
person’s name, if it is in the format FirstName MiddleName SecondName or
FirstName M. SecondName, etc. The surrogate string used to replace the
original PHI is then matched to the correct format. If no format is auto-
matically identified by Anonym, then the string is formatted according to a
randomly selected known format. In the experiments reported in this article,
we used automatic generated PHIs scrapped from the Web.
Dates are instead automatically shifted (forwards or backwards5) by a
random offset. This offset is generated for each document and is applied to
3http://www.whitepages.com/; for example http://www.whitepages.com/ind/a is
used to gather names of people whose surname starts with the letter A. URLs were last
accessed on March 17, 2014.
4For example, hospitals names are gathered by mining the webpage at http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hospitals_in_the_United_States/ (Accessed: March
17, 2014).
5An allowed date range is used to maintain dates constrained within a time period
to avoid the generation of unrealistic data surrogates, i.e., those in the future or in the
distant past.
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all dates in that document; thus dates in one document may all be shifted
backwards 2 months, while dates in a second document may be shifted for-
wards 10 days.
Phone numbers are randomly generated using the same number of digits
used in the original PHIs. We implemented different phone number gener-
ators tailored to United States and Australia, with restrictions on the area
code used. However, we did not use these restrictions in the experiments
reported in this article.
ID numbers, accession numbers, and other relevant codes are replaced
with randomly generated codes that follow the same structure of the original
PHIs, i.e., by replacing a random digit with each digit in the original PHI,
and a random character for each character in the original PHI.
4.3. Experimental settings
The features described in Section 3 were used to build the CRF classi-
fier. The model was trained using features extracted from documents in the
training set, while features extracted from test set documents were used for
producing prediction outputs by the CRF classifier. The Stanford Part-of-
Speech Tagger [17] was used for the part of speech feature; the tagger was
trained on the Wall Street Journal corpus. We did not test all possible com-
binations of features due to the large number of experiments required to do
so; instead, we used the family of “basic” features across all tested settings
(BASIC ); we then combined “basic” features with each other feature family
independently. Part-of-speech (POS ) and regular expressions (REG) were
considered separately and their combination with the other features was also
investigated. Finally, we constructed a model that considered all combined
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features (BOTH ).
For evaluating Anonym on the i2b2 dataset, the same train/test method-
ology used in the 2006 challenge was used in this article, with test data not
analysed during the training phase. Evaluation over the CINSW and MT-
Samples datasets was carried out using 10-fold cross validation. Each dataset
was randomly divided into 10 folds of equal size; 9 of these folds were then
used to train the classifier and the remaining fold to evaluate Anonym. The
process was iterated 10 times, using a different fold for testing. Evaluation
measures were then averaged over the performance recorded on the testing
folds.
We also evaluated Anonym across datasets, by training the CRF classifier
on one dataset and testing on another. In previous work, we investigated the
performance of Anonym when trained on the full i2b2 dataset (i.e., both
training and testing data) and tested on a small set of pathology reports
from Cancer Institute New South Wales [12]. In those initial experiments,
we found that only a subset of PHIs were recognised with F-measure between
0.5 and 0.6; while other PHIs were poorly or not recognised at all. Here, we
used the new CINSW dataset and the MTSamples dataset for cross-dataset
effectiveness analysis.
While it seems intuitive to require high-recall performance in de-identification
tasks because of the importance of removing all PHIs that may identify a
person, it can be argued that high-precision is also necessary to guarantee
that vital non-PHIs are not removed from the free-text documents. This is
because the erroneous removal of important information such as the name of
a disease (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) may render a document useless for sec-
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ondary purposes. In the MTSamples dataset, strings identifying diseases or
devices that may be erroneously identified as PHIs (e.g. because containing
the name of a person) have been manually annotated [13]. This supports
the importance of precision, beside recall, in evaluating de-identification sys-
tems. Therefore, F-measure (the harmonic mean of precision and recall) is
chosen as the primary evaluation measure in the experiments of this arti-
cle. To allow further comparison between our results and previous work that
used the i2b2 dataset, we also report precision and recall for this dataset,
along with the number of true positive (TP), false positive (FP) and false
negative (FN) instances. Further analysis of the results, involving the study
of precision-recall curves are left for future work.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Performance on the i2b2 dataset
Figure 1 summaries the F-measure values recorded for all feature set-
tings of Anonym over the testing set of the i2b2 dataset. The use of BASIC
and POS features provided the best average F-measure (0.9300) on the i2b2
dataset and is represented by green dots in Figure 1. This result suggests
that the pattern matching features contribute more to the de-identification
effectiveness than other features, and in particular more than part-of-speech.
As a reference, the best model from the 2006 i2b2 shared task [5] (the sub-
mission named Wellner 3, identified by the red dots in Figure 1), achieved
an average F-measure of 0.925 on the considered PHIs, while the average
F-measure obtained by the top 3 systems was 0.923. Table 4 reports a sum-
mary of the performance of Anonym on the i2b2 dataset when using the
17


















Figure 1: F-measure values obtained by Anonym using different combinations of features
on the 2006 i2b2 shared task. Green points refer to the performance achieved by the best
(average) combination of features (REG). Red points refer to the performance of the best
system at the 2006 i2b2 challenge.
REG features.
The heights of the whiskers in the box-plots of Figure 1 represent the stan-
dard deviation in F-measure across all considered feature settings. It can be
observed that PHIs for which Anonym showed higher variability with respect
to feature combination are rare PHIs in the dataset (compared with Table 3).
Whereas, using one combination of features in place of another is found to
have little effect on those PHIs with larger number of samples (dates, doc-
tors, IDs): these exhibit very high effectiveness and no, or marginal, variance
across features. We then conjecture that Anonym can be very effective for
de-identification if trained with enough samples. In addition, given that the
settings that perform best overall obtained a F-measure lower than average
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Table 4: Effectiveness (Precision P, Recall R, F-measure F-m, number of true positive TP,
false positive FP, false negative FN) of the REG setting of Anonym on ib2b test set.
PHI Type P R F-m TP FP FN
DATE .9967 .9810 .9888 2,122 7 41
DOCTOR .9860 .9771 .9815 2,259 32 53
HOSPITAL .9880 .9093 .9470 1,483 18 148
ID .9983 .9958 .9971 1,195 2 5
LOCATION .9643 .6750 .7941 162 6 78
PATIENT .996 .9688 .9822 497 2 16
PHONE 1.0000 .6941 .8194 59 0 26
Avg. .9899 .8859 .9300
on the phone PHI, constructing different classifiers for identifying different
PHIs may be more effective than learning a single CRF classifier.
5.2. Performance on other datasets
Table 5 summaries the effectiveness of Anonym, measured by F-measure
values, on both the CINSW and MTSamples datasets across PHI types and
Anonym’s settings.
5.2.1. Performance on the MTSamples dataset
Anonym provides high de-identification effectiveness across all PHI types
in the MTSample dataset, achieving average F-measure values up to .9807.
This is obtained using the POS features or both POS and REG features; how-
ever, there is no significant difference between the effectiveness of any of the
different settings of Anonym over this dataset. Phone numbers and person
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Table 5: F-measure values obtained by different settings of Anonym on the CINSW and
MTSamples datasets using 10-fold cross validation for training the conditional random
field models. The highest F-measure obtained for each personal health identifier type
within a dataset is highlighted in bold.
CINSW dataset MTSamples dataset
PHI Type BASIC POS REG BOTH BASIC POS REG BOTH
AGE .3667 .3667 .3667 .3667 .9837 .9840 .9843 .9840
DATE .9400 .9362 .9432 .9362 .9930 .9941 .9941 .9941
ID .9911 .9898 .9897 .9898 .9930 .9925 .9925 .9925
INSTIT. .7652 .7773 .7670 .7773 .9973 .9959 .9970 .9959
NAME .9133 .9115 .9129 .9115 .9425 .9462 .9443 .9462
PHONE .9699 .9685 .9692 .9685 .9714 .9714 .9714 .9714
Avg. .8244 .8250 .8248 .8250 .9802 .9807 .9806 .9807
names are more problematic for Anonym to de-identify in the MTSamples
dataset, with F-measure performance below 0.98 for these PHI types. As
reported in Table 3, in the MTSamples dataset there is only a limited num-
ber of occurrences of PHI types names and phones (286 and 7 respectively):
this can explain the low performance for these PHI types. However, the PHI
type ID also only occurs less than 100 times, but Anonym identifies IDs with
performance above average and consistent throughout different Anonym set-
tings. Manual analysis of ID instances in this dataset revealed that there
is little variance among the format of IDs, while there is higher variance in
the format of names and phones (e.g. with or without area codes). The low
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variance in the format of IDs produced easier patterns to be learnt by the
CRF classifier. Note that in this instance, POS and REG features do not
contribute higher effectiveness.
5.2.2. Performance on the CINSW dataset
The effectiveness of Anonym in de-identifying reports from the CINSW
dataset is lower than that recorded on the i2b2 dataset. As in the i2b2
dataset, the highest effectiveness is achieved when only POS or both REG
and POS features are used; in these settings Anonym obtains an F-measure
of 0.8250. These settings, however, are found to be more effective than oth-
ers only when the institution PHI type is considered: this is a relatively rare
type in that dataset (177 occurrences, as reported in Table 3). The fact that
part-of-speech features do sensibly improve classification for the institution
type suggests that the syntactic forms used to mention pathology labs, hos-
pitals, etc., in the CINSW dataset are very similar. Anonym has difficulty
in identifying mentions of age in the CINSW dataset (F-measure of 0.3667);
this is due to the small number of occurrences of ages. Higher effectiveness
is obtained when more frequent PHI types are considered, e.g., IDs, names,
dates. However, there is not a linear relationship between number of occur-
rences of a PHI and the performance of Anonym: manual inspection of the
data reveals that this is because of the variance in forms between occurrences
of different PHIs. For example, although in this dataset there are less oc-
currences of IDs than those of names, the lengths of strings associated with
IDs and the strings surrounding these PHIs, i.e. context, are more similar
than lengths and contexts of names. Finally, a manual inspection of the data
highlighted that OCR errors do not seem to affect string associated with
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PHIs, although neighbouring strings do contain OCR errors.
Table 6: F-measure values obtained by different settings of Anonym on the CINSW and
MTSamples datasets when using the other dataset for training. The highest F-measure
obtained for each personal health identifier type within a dataset is highlighted in bold.
train:MTSamples; test:CINSW train:CINSW; test:MTSamples
PHI Type BASIC POS REG BOTH BASIC POS REG BOTH
AGE .2128 .2439 .2439 .2439 0.0880 0.0800 .1268 .1268
DATE .5408 .5319 .5408 .5319 .3688 .3694 .3708 .3694
ID .4394 .3167 .3374 .3374 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.000
INSTIT. .5337 .5972 .5972 .5972 .3011 .2501 .2501 .2501
NAME .0106 .0095 .0095 .0095 .0194 .02800 .0306 .0280
PHONE .0098 .0098 .0098 .0098 .4000 .2222 .2222 .2222
Avg. .2912 .2848 .2898 .2883 .3629 .3263 .3334 .3328
5.3. Performance when porting Anonym across datasets
Table 6 reports the effectiveness of Anonym when CRF models are learnt
on the MTSamples datasets and tested on the CINSW dataset, and vice
versa, when trained on the CINSW and tested on the MTSamples. In both
sets of experiments, low de-identification effectiveness is recorded, with the
best average F-measure ranging between 0.2912 and 0.3629 and the basic
features providing the highest effectiveness. When testing on the CINSW
dataset, Anonym achieves the highest effectiveness on dates and institu-
tions. While the part-of-speech and regular expression features are overall
outperformed by the use of basic features only, these do provide consistently
better performance on the institution PHI type. This result is similar to
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that reported in Table 5: these features were also found to provide higher
de-identification effectiveness for mentions of institutions. Very poor per-
formance is obtained when de-identifying names and phone numbers on the
CINSW dataset; this is likely due to the small amount of training occurrences
for these PHI types present in MTSamples. Higher average effectiveness is
recorded when testing on MTSamples and training on CINSW, where ages
are infrequent in the training dataset. This explains the low performance
for this type of PHI, although a small gain is obtained by regular expression
features over the BASIC and POS features for this PHI. Surprisingly, all IDs
in the MTSamples dataset are recognised with perfect precision (F-measure
1.0). A manual analysis of IDs in the training and testing dataset, how-
ever, did not unveil strong similarities between the formats of IDs, or their
contexts.
6. Summary of findings
In answer to our first research question (RQ1, Section 4), the experiments
and analysis revealed that Anonym is effective across datasets, with overall
F-measures ranging between 0.81 and 0.98. Anonym does provide state-of-
the-art effectiveness on the i2b2 2006 shared task, with an average F-measure
value higher than the best system at i2b2.
We found that the effectiveness of Anonym is not solely dependent on
the amount of available training occurrences, as F-measures across PHIs did
not seem to be linearly correlated with the number of occurrences (RQ2). A
manual analysis of the data suggested that in most cases it is the combination
of training size and variation among PHIs format that influences effectiveness.
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Cases have been highlighted in our experiments where Anonym has achieved
higher de-identification effectiveness over less frequent but more cohesive PHI
types than over those PHI types that were more frequent.
No one feature set consistently performed best in our experiments (RQ3).
While the features produced by regular expressions provided the highest
effectiveness on the i2b2 dataset, a similar finding was not confirmed on the
CINSW and MTSamples data, where part-of-speech features (as well as both
POS and REG) were found to be more effective. When combining these two
datasets for training and testing, the basic set of features provided instead
the highest effectiveness.
In terms of robustness (RQ4), the de-identification capabilities of Anonym
are found to adapt to different data (e.g., discharge summaries vs. pathol-
ogy reports), conventions (United States vs. Australia), and quality (typed
vs. OCRed). However, for Anonym to be effective, enough training data
has to be provided and this has to be consistent with the documents that
are expected to be given for de-identification. In absence of enough train-
ing samples or when data comes from a different dataset, Anonym achieves
unsatisfactory performance.
7. Conclusions
Accessing and sharing EHRs is fundamental for fostering data mining,
information retrieval and natural language processing research that aims to
improve health service delivery and medical knowledge discovery. These pos-
sibilities are however hindered by the presence of personal health information
in free-text health records; de-identification of this information is required for
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the secondary use of this data for research. Manual de-identification is time
and resource consuming. In this article, we have evaluated a software solu-
tion for the de-identification of EHRs, called Anonym. We have evaluated
Anonym across datasets and settings, and found that Anonym is effective
and robust to variation in the data if trained with enough and representative
samples.
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